Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/208473 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working paper No. 11-2003
Verlag: 
Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics, Frederiksberg
Zusammenfassung: 
While examining the macroeconomic effects of increased government control of the informal sector, this paper develops a two-sector general equilibrium model featuring matching frictions and worker-firm wage bargaining. Workers search for jobs in both the formal and the informal sector. We analyse the impact of higher punishment rates and a higher audit rate on labour market performance. We find that a higher punishment rate reduces the size of the informal sector and reduces unemployment. A higher audit rate has an ambiguous impact on unemployment, and may actually increase the size of the underground economy.
Schlagwörter: 
Tax evasion
underground economy
matching
bargaining
unemployment
JEL: 
H26
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
287.76 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.