Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/208463 
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Working paper No. 1-2003
Publisher: 
Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics, Frederiksberg
Abstract: 
We discuss the existence of a pooling equilibrium in a two-period model of an insurance market with asymmetric information. We solve the model numerically. We pay particular attention to the reasons for non-existence in cases where no pooling equilibrium exists. In addition to the phenom- enon of cream skimming emphasized in earlier literature, we here point to the the importance of the opposite: dregs skimming, whereby high-risk consumers are proÞtably detracted from the candidate pooling contract.
Subjects: 
Insurance
Insurance Companies
Transactional relationships
Reputation
JEL: 
D82
G22
L14
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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