Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/208457 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working paper No. 8-2002
Verlag: 
Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics, Frederiksberg
Zusammenfassung: 
We show that when the researcher’s (observable but not contractible) contribution to innovation is crucial, a covenant not to compete (CNC) reduces e.ort and profits under both spot and relational contracts. Having no CNC allows the researcher to leave for a rival. This alleviates a commitment problem by forcing the firm to reward a successful researcher. However, if the firm’s R&D investment mainly matters, including a CNC in the contract is optimal, as it ensures the firm’s incentives to invest.
Schlagwörter: 
Innovation
intellectual property rights
labor contracts
poaching
relational contracts
start-ups
JEL: 
J30
K20
L14
O31
O34
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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