Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/208450 
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
Working paper No. 1-2002
Publisher: 
Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics, Frederiksberg
Abstract: 
We analyze how the structure of organizational form of legislative institutions affects interest groups ’incentives to lobby.Lobbying is modelled the strategic provision of information by an interest group to a multi-person legislature.We show that the effectiveness of lobbying lies in changing the viable policy coalitions.We show in a multi-period policy framework that a distinguishing feature between the US Congress and European parliamentary systems – the vote of confidence procedure - can significantly change the incentives for interest group lobbying.
Subjects: 
Organizational form
legislative institutions
Lobbying
Parliamentary systems
Politics
Interest groups
JEL: 
A10
E10
E60
H00
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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