Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/208438 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2000
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working paper No. 16-2000
Verlag: 
Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics, Frederiksberg
Zusammenfassung: 
We investigate the patterns of ultimate distribution of ownership in a sample of small closely held corporations. Motivated by recent corporate governance theories we define control dilution as the absenc of a single dominating shareholder. Most firms have one or two ultimate owners implying that control is very concentrated. However, we find strong evidence for control dilution in firms with multiple owners and we proceed to analyze three potential explanations: a general strategic motive, a coalition formation argument and the presence of family ownership. We find the strongest evidence for a general strategic motive and we clearly reject that the observed control dilution is due to family ownership. Finally, we show that the probability of control dilution increases with manager ownership and number of owners, but decreases with the age of the firm and with the presence of family ownership.
Schlagwörter: 
Ownership Distribution
Control Allocation
Closely Held Corporations
JEL: 
G32
G34
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
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Dokumentart: 
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