Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/208338 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ECB Working Paper No. 2304
Verlag: 
European Central Bank (ECB), Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
We study optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a New Keynesian model where occasional declines in agents' confidence can give rise to persistent liquidity trap episodes. Unlike in the case of fundamental-driven liquidity traps, there is no straightforward recipe for mitigating the welfare costs and the systematic in ation shortfall associated with expectations-driven liquidity traps. Raising the in ation target or appointing an in ation-conservative central banker improves in ation outcomes away from the lower bound but exacerbates the shortfall at the lower bound. Using government spending as an additional policy tool worsens stabilization outcomes both at and away from the lower bound. However, appointing a policymaker who is sufficiently less concerned with government spending stabilization than society can eliminate expectations-driven liquidity traps altogether.
Schlagwörter: 
Effective Lower Bound
Sunspot Equilibria
Monetary Policy
Fiscal Policy
Discretion
Policy Delegation
JEL: 
E52
E61
E62
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
ISBN: 
978-92-899-3566-1
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
833.92 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.