Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/208268 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ECB Working Paper No. 2234
Verlag: 
European Central Bank (ECB), Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze the effect of bank capital requirements on the structure and risk of a financial system where markets, regulated banks, and shadow banks coexist. Banks face a moral hazard problem in screening entrepreneurs' projects, and they choose whether to be regulated or not. If regulated, a supervisor certifies their capital; if not, they have to rely on more expensive private certification. Under both risk-insensitive and risk-sensitive requirements, safer entrepreneurs borrow from the market and riskier entrepreneurs borrow from banks. But risk-insensitive (sensitive) requirements are especially costly for relatively safe (risky) entrepreneurs, which may shift from regulated to shadow banks.
JEL: 
G21
G23
G28
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
ISBN: 
978-92-899-3496-1
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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