Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/208210 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IDB Working Paper Series No. IDB-WP-1074
Verlag: 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Washington, DC
Zusammenfassung: 
This research examines the effect of accountability threats for low performing schools on resource allocation decisions and provides evidence that schools act with strategic behavior only when the accountability pressure is high. We used a generalization of a traditional regression discontinuity design, taking advantage of the sharp discontinuity in the Chilean accountability system's ranking of schools based on performance measures, and of a unique school level expenditure data set, to make causal estimates of the effect of being ranked as "low-performing" on school spending decisions. The results indicate that, while first time low-performing schools do not change their resource allocation strategy, chronically underperforming schools are more likely to hire external technical pedagogical support and invest in teacher training that may help them boost achievement in the short and medium-term and avoid sanctions.
Schlagwörter: 
School accountability
school spending
school finance
Chile
vouchers
JEL: 
I22
I28
H52
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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