Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20773
Authors: 
Bratti, Massimiliano
Staffolani, Stefano
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion paper series 1474
Abstract: 
In this paper we describe the hypothesis of effort-based career opportunities as a situation in which profit maximizing firms create incentives for employees to work longer hours than the bargained ones, by making career prospects dependent on working hours. When effortbased career opportunities are effective, they raise working time and output per worker reducing workers? utility. A first attempt is made to empirically estimate the relationship between hours worked and the expected opportunities of promotion using the British Household Panel Survey data set. Our analysis shows that the perceived probability of promotion increases with working time and that this result is robust to various econometric specifications.
Subjects: 
bargaining
career
personnel management
promotion
welfare
working time
JEL: 
J23
M12
J22
J50
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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