Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20769
Authors: 
Ahituv, Avner
Lerman, Robert I.
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion paper series 1470
Abstract: 
This study examines the interplay between job stability, wage rates, and marital instability. We use a Dynamic Selection Control model in which young men make sequential choices about work and family. Our empirical estimates derived from the model account for selfselection, simultaneity and unobserved heterogeneity. The results capture how job stability affects earnings, how both affect marital status, and how marital status affects earnings and job stability. The study reveals robust evidence that job instability lowers wages and the likelihood of getting and remaining married. At the same time, marriage raises wages and job stability. To project the sequential effects linking job stability, marital status, and earnings, we simulate the impacts of shocks that raise preferences for marriage and that increase education. Feedback effects cause the simulated wage gains from marriage to cumulate over time, indicating that long-run marriage wage premiums exceed conventional short-run estimates.
Subjects: 
marriage and marital dissolution
job turnover
wage rates
panel data
JEL: 
J31
J63
C33
C15
J12
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
601.57 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.