Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/207637 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper Series No. 661
Verlag: 
University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
We study allocation behavior when outcome inequality is inevitable but a fair process is feasible, as in selecting one person from several candidates for a job or award. We show that allocators may be influenced by inappropriate criteria, impeding the implementation of a fair process. We study four interventions to induce process fairness without restricting the allocator's decisions: Increasing the transparency of the allocation process; providing a private randomization device; allowing the allocator to delegate to a public randomization device; and allowing the allocator to avoid information on inappropriate criteria. All interventions except transparency have positive effects, but differ substantially in their impact.
Schlagwörter: 
equality
procedural justice
discrimination
JEL: 
D63
D73
J70
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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