Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/207416
Authors: 
Bertoni, Marco
Brunello, Giorgio
De Benedetto, Marco Alberto
De Paola, Maria
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 12591
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
We use the repeated random assignment of external examiners to school institutes in Italy to investigate whether the effect of external monitoring on test score manipulation persists over time. We find that this effect is still present in the tests taken one year after exposure to the examiners, and is stronger for open-ended questions, for small school institutes, and for institutes located in the northern and central regions of the country. In the second year after exposure, however, this effect disappears, suggesting that monitoring is a symptomatic treatment rather than a cure of score manipulation. We discuss learning, reputational concerns, peer pressure and teacher preferences as potential mechanisms behind our findings, and present some evidence on the role played by social capital and high stakes.
Subjects: 
education
testing
external monitoring
long-run effects
JEL: 
H52
I2
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
1.29 MB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.