Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/207412 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 12587
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
We present experiments exploring why high ability workers join teams with less able co-workers when there are no short-term financial benefits. We distinguish between two explanations: pro-social preferences and expected long-term financial gains from teaching future teammates. Participants perform a real-effort task and decide whether to work independently or join a two-person team. Treatments vary the payment scheme (piece rate or revenue sharing), whether teammates can communicate, and the role of teaching. High ability workers are more willing to join teams in the absence of revenue sharing and less willing to join teams when they cannot communicate. When communication is possible, the choice of high ability workers to join teams is driven by expected future financial gains from teaching rather than some variety of pro-social preferences. This result has important implications for the role of adverse selection in determining the productivity of teams.
Subjects: 
teams
teaching
revenue sharing
social preferences
self-selection
experiment
JEL: 
C92
D23
M52
M53
J24
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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