Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/207375
Authors: 
Leonardi, Marco
Mossucca, Rossella
Schivardi, Fabiano
Severgnini, Battista
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 12549
Abstract: 
We study the potential benefits and mechanisms of firms' political connections by analyzing the Italian experience, where, in the early nineties, Silvio Berlusconi, a rich TV tycoon, became the leader of the conservative political coalition. Using firm-level data, we find that the 101 companies supporting Berlusconi's successful bid to become prime minister did better than controls in terms of sales and employment but not of productivity. The results are confirmed when we instrument the decision to support Berlusconi with electoral outcomes in the 1921 elections. We also find suggestive evidence that the supporters' superior performance is stronger in sectors with high external financial dependence and high advertising intensity.
Subjects: 
political connections
productivity
policy regulation
JEL: 
G32
G38
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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