Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/207271 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7880
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
The purpose of this paper is to model the influence of Kantian moral scruples in a dynamic environment. Our objectives are two-fold. Firstly, we investigate how a Nash equilibrium among agents who have moral scruples may ensure that the exploitation of a common property renewable resource is Pareto efficient at every point of time. Secondly, we outline a prototype model that shows, in an overlapping generation framework, how a community’s sense of morality may evolve over time and identifies conditions under which the community may reach a steady state level of morality in which everyone is perfectly Kantian.
Schlagwörter: 
tragedy of the commons
dynamic games
Nash equilibrium
self-image
categorical imperative
JEL: 
C71
D62
D71
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
257.15 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.