Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/207269 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7878
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
While the formal decision of the ECB Council to impose interest on Target claims and liabilities is meaningless, this paper shows that the pooling of primary interest income among national central banks in the Eurozone implies that Target and cash balances do, in fact, bear an effective rate of interest. The magnitude of this effective rate of interest is given by a weighted average of the ECB’s policy interest rates where (i) the relative country sizes and (ii) the uses of alternative sources and sinks of international liquidity flows determine the weights. Without countervailing transactions, which would effectively service the Target claims and liabilities, Target balances grow with compound interest. The payment of interest on Target balances internalizes the competitive externality that otherwise could induce excessive money supply in a decentralized monetary system of the kind characterizing the Eurozone. It also implies that the recording of Target balances in the balance sheets of national central banks is compatible with fair value accounting.
Schlagwörter: 
Target2
ECB
interest
competitive seignorage externality
JEL: 
E40
F41
F45
H60
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.