Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/207244
Authors: 
Gu, Yiquan
Madio, Leonardo
Reggiani, Carlo
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7853
Abstract: 
The unprecedented access of firms to consumer level data not only facilitates more precisely targeted individual pricing but also alters firms’ strategic incentives. We show that exclusive access to a list of consumers can provide incentives for a firm to endogenously assume the price leader’s role, and so to strategically manipulate its rival’s price. Prices and profits are non-monotonic in the length of the consumer list. For an intermediate size, price leadership entails a semi-collusive outcome, characterized by supra-competitive prices and low consumer surplus. In contrast, for short or long lists of consumers, exclusive data availability intensifies market competition.
Subjects: 
exclusive data
price leadership
personalized pricing
price discrimination
JEL: 
D43
K21
L11
L13
L41
L86
M21
M31
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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