Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/207199 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7808
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
We present controlled experimental evidence on how rent extraction by an administrator affects giving to non-profit associations. Holding the price of giving constant, we compare contributions between two conditions: a rent extraction condition, in which an administrator can expropriate a part of the contributions and a control condition without rent extraction. We find that rent extraction strongly reduces average contributions. Studying the channels through which this effect operates, we demonstrate that rent extraction has situational spillovers, suggesting that it undermines the contributors’ general preference for giving. In contrast, we do not find evidence for negative reciprocity towards the administrator.
Subjects: 
rent extraction
donations
prosocial behavior
JEL: 
D02
D03
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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