Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/207192 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7801
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
Did the Prussian three-class franchise, which politically over-represented the economic elite, affect policy-making? Combining MP-level political orientation, derived from all roll call votes in the Prussian parliament (1867–1903), with constituency characteristics, we analyze how local vote inequality, determined by tax payments, affected policymaking during Prussia’s period of rapid industrialization. Contrary to the predominant view that the franchise system produced a conservative parliament, higher vote inequality is associated with more liberal voting, especially in regions with large-scale industry. We argue that industrialists preferred self-serving liberal policies and were able to coordinate on suitable MPs when vote inequality was high.
Subjects: 
inequality
political economy
three-class franchise
elites
Prussia
JEL: 
D72
N43
N93
P26
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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