Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/207133
Authors: 
Matter, Ulrich
Roberti, Paolo
Slotwinski, Michaela
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 19-052
Abstract: 
We assess the influence of moneyed interests on legislative decisions. Our theory predicts that the vote outcome distribution and donation flows in a legislature feature a discontinuity at the approval threshold of bills if special interest groups are involved in vote buying. Testing the theoretical predictions based on two decades of roll-call voting in the U.S. House, we identify the link between narrowly passed bills and well-timed campaign contributions. Several pieces of evidence substantiate our main finding, suggesting that moneyed interests exert remarkably effective control over the passage of contested bills.
Subjects: 
legislative voting
campaign finance
special interest groups
lobbying
forensic economics
JEL: 
D72
D78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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