Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/207122
Authors: 
Fahn, Matthias
Seibel, Regina
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 1909
Abstract: 
We study optimal employment contracts for present-biased employees who can conduct on-the-job search. Presuming that fims cannot offer long-term contracts, we find that individuals who are naive about their present bias will actually be better off than sophisticated or time-consistent individuals. Moreover, they search more, which partially counteracts the ineffciencies caused by their present bias.
Subjects: 
Present bias
on-the-job search
JEL: 
D21
D83
D90
J31
J32
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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