Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/206852
Authors: 
Ewerhart, Christian
Kovenock, Daniel J.
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper 336
Abstract: 
We consider a class of incomplete-information Colonel Blotto games in which N Ï 2 agents are engaged in (N + 1) battlefields. An agent's vector of battlefield valuations is drawn from a generalized sphere in Lp-space. We identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which any agent's resource allocation to a given battlefield is strictly monotone in the agent's valuation of that battlefield. In contrast to the single-unit case, however, agents never enjoy any information rent. We also outline an extension to networks of Blotto games.
Subjects: 
Colonel Blotto games
private information
Bayes-Nash equilibrium
information rents
networks
JEL: 
C72
D72
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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