Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/206850
Authors: 
Smirnov, Aleksei
Starkov, Egor
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper 334
Abstract: 
The paper studies a dynamic communication game in the presence of adverse selection and career concerns. A forecaster of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome of some future event. We find that in all equilibria in a sufficiently general class earlier reports are more credible. Further, any report hurts the forecaster's reputation in the short run, with later reports incurring larger penalties. The reputation of a silent forecaster, on the other hand, gradually improves over time.
Subjects: 
career concerns
reputation
dynamic games
games of timing
strategic information transmission
JEL: 
C73
D82
D83
D84
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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