Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20671 
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dc.contributor.authorGächter, Simonen
dc.contributor.authorRiedl, Arnoen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:15:51Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:15:51Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20671-
dc.description.abstractTheoretical research on claims problems has concentrated on normative properties andaxiomatizations of solution concepts. We complement these analyses by empirical evidenceon the predictability of three classical solution concepts in a bankruptcy problem. Weexamine both people's impartial normative evaluations as well as their actual negotiationbehavior in a bargaining with claims environment. We measure people's judgments on thenormative attractiveness of solution concepts with the help of a survey and also observeactual agreements in a bargaining experiment with real money at stake. We find that theproportional solution is the normatively most attractive rule, whereas actual negotiationagreements are closest to the 'constrained equal award' solution.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x1375en
dc.subject.jelD63en
dc.subject.jelC78en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordbankruptcy problems with claimsen
dc.subject.keywordproportional ruleen
dc.subject.keywordequal-awards ruleen
dc.subject.keywordequallosses ruleen
dc.subject.keywordfairnessen
dc.subject.keywordlaboratory experimenten
dc.subject.keywordvignetteen
dc.subject.stwKonkursverwaltungen
dc.subject.stwGerechtigkeiten
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen
dc.titleDividing Justly in Bargaining Problems with Claims: Normative Judgments and Actual Negotiations-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn476090067en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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