Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20647
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dc.contributor.authorHagedorn, Marcusen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:15:40Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:15:40Z-
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20647-
dc.description.abstractThis paper adds to the current literature on incomplete contracting that argues that deviating from a complete information, transaction-cost free environment may be may generate valuable insights. We achieve this by assuming bargaining with asymmetric information. We consider the consequences of asymmetric information for investment decisions and for the assignment of property rights. This analysis is crucial since any foundation must ensure that results of the kind derived by Grossman, Hart and Moore still hold. It is shown that investment incentives are guided by an additional element to standard hold-up models since the outcome of bargaining depends directly on the investment level. This may for example result in cooperative overinvestment. Although investment incentives are always positive from a social perspective, they can be negative from an individual's perspective. In our model, property rights are shown to still play a role. This arises from their tight interaction with ex-post bargaining. Optimal ownership structures are characterized and a new role for option contracts is identified.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion paper series |x690en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelD81en_US
dc.subject.jelD23en_US
dc.subject.jelL14en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordprivate valuesen_US
dc.subject.keywordownershipen_US
dc.subject.keywordproperty rightsen_US
dc.subject.keywordincomplete contractsen_US
dc.subject.keywordhold-upen_US
dc.subject.stwUnvollständiger Vertragen_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwBetriebliche Investitionspolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwEigentumsrechtstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleContracting with Private Informationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn362044813en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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