Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/206324 
Year of Publication: 
2015
Citation: 
[Journal:] BRQ Business Research Quarterly [ISSN:] 2340-9436 [Volume:] 18 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Elsevier España [Place:] Barcelona [Year:] 2015 [Pages:] 161-173
Publisher: 
Elsevier España, Barcelona
Abstract: 
We address the influence of directors who represent institutional investors in three aspects of board compensation policies: level of compensation, composition, and performance sensitivity. We differentiate pressure-sensitive directors (i.e., with business links) and pressure-resistant directors (i.e., without business links). Our results show that pressure-resistant directors decrease total board compensation and its fixed proportion, whereas they increase the variable proportion of total remuneration and the pay-for-performance sensitivity. By contrast, pressure-sensitive directors offer the opposite results. These findings are consistent with the view that institutional investors are not a homogeneous group and that pressure-resistant directors fulfill a more thorough monitoring role."
Subjects: 
Corporate governance
Institutional investors
Board of directors
Remuneration
Compensation
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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