Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/206286
Authors: 
Sarel, Roee
Demirtas, Melanie
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
ILE Working Paper Series 28
Abstract: 
We analyze the countervailing incentives that mid-level appellate judges face when deciding whether to remand a case back to the lower court. Although appellate courts' ability to remand cases can mitigate moral hazard problems, by restraining trial court judges, it may sometimes instead exacerbate such problems - by enabling the midlevel appellate judges to circumvent the top-level court's preferences through delegation. Our empirical assessment reveals a 'Subsequent Remand Effect': cases that are remanded by the Supreme Court to the appellate court are far more likely to be subsequently remanded again to the district court compared to other cases. We check whether this effect originates from legitimate case-relevant reasons or from moral hazard by exploiting variations in ideological distances between court levels and through a textual analysis. We find that the size of the effect varies with the composition of ideologies, which seems consistent with moral hazard.
Subjects: 
remands
federal courts
appeals
judicial ideology
ideological distance
JEL: 
K41
D02
P48
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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