Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20627 
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 1356
Publisher: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
We examine the effects of performance measure properties on incentive system design, using data on incentive contracts for auto dealership managers. The data include information on five properties: two indicators of risk; two indicators of distortion; and one indicator of potential manipulation. We find that these properties have important effects on incentive system design. First, firms appear to choose the ?best? performance measure available along these dimensions, and use it for the most important (primary) formula bonus. Second, the properties of this primary performance measure are important determinants of the weight placed on the measure for explicit. Third, firms appear to use other performance measures to balance multitask incentives relative to the primary performance measure. Specifically, we find evidence that second and third bonuses are used to provide better incentives for cooperation and to reduce incentives for manipulation. Fourth, we present evidence that subjectivity, through discretionary bonuses based on subjective performance evaluations, and also through implicit incentives for promotions and other rewards, also appear to play the same roles.
Subjects: 
performance measures
incentives
JEL: 
J33
M52
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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