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Autoren: 
Danziger, Leif
Neuman, Shoshana
Datum: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 709
Zusammenfassung: 
In many countries, an expired labor contract is automatically extended during the often protracted delay before the new contract is signed. Our theoretical model focuses on macroeconomic factors in explaining the delay. It emphasizes the importance of the realized nominal and real shocks, and of the levels of nominal and real uncertainty. The model is tested using Israeli collective wage agreements where long delays are frequent. The empirical findings strongly support the theoretical model. Thus, nominal uncertainty is found to increase the delay, and real uncertainty to decrease the delay, but less in the public than in the private sector.
Schlagwörter: 
labor contract
renewal
delay
JEL: 
J52
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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