Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20615
Authors: 
Lee, Jungmin
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion paper series 1345
Abstract: 
This study examines whether people optimally respond to prize incentives for risk taking in tournaments. I exploit the television game show World Poker Tour as a natural experiment. The results show that professional players strategically choose the degree of risk taking depending on the incentives implied by the prize structure they face. I find that they are more sensitive to losses than to gains.
Subjects: 
risk
tournament
poker
JEL: 
M5
D8
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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