Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20611
Authors: 
Carpenter, Jeffrey P.
Burks, Stephen V.
Verhoogen, Eric A.
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion paper series 1341
Abstract: 
To investigate the external validity of Ultimatum and Dictator game behavior we conduct experiments in field settings with naturally occurring variation in "social framing." Our participants are students at Middlebury College, non-traditional students at Kansas City Kansas Community College (KCKCC), and employees at a Kansas City distribution center. Ultimatum game offers are ordered: KCKCC > employee > Middlebury. In the Dictator game employees are more generous than students in either location. This indicates that workers behaved distinctly from both student groups because their allocations do not decrease between games, an effect we attribute to the social framing of the workplace.
Subjects: 
Ultimatum game
Dictator game
fairness
reciprocity
field experiment
JEL: 
Z13
J24
C93
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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