Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20600
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dc.contributor.authorKoch, Alexander K.en_US
dc.contributor.authorPeyrache, Eloïcen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:15:18Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:15:18Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20600-
dc.description.abstractAn essential ingredient in models of career concerns is ex ante uncertainty about an agent'stype. This paper shows how career concerns can arise even in the absence of any such exante uncertainty, if the unobservable actions that an agent takes influence his futureproductivity. By implementing effort in mixed strategies the principal can endogenouslyinduce uncertainty about the agent's ex post productivity and generate reputationalincentives. Our main result is that creating such ambiguity can be optimal for the principal,even though this exposes the agent to additional risk and reduces output. This findingdemonstrates the importance of mixed strategies in contracting environments with imperfectcommitment, which contrasts with standard agency models where implementing mixedstrategy actions typically is not optimal if pure strategies are also implementable.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn-
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion paper series |x1331en_US
dc.subject.jelM12en_US
dc.subject.jelL14en_US
dc.subject.jelJ33en_US
dc.subject.jelD80en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordincentive contractsen_US
dc.subject.keywordreputationen_US
dc.subject.keywordmixed strategiesen_US
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsanreizen_US
dc.subject.stwPrestigeen_US
dc.subject.stwKarriereplanungen_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleMixed Up? : That's Good for Motivationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn474213412en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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