Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20600 
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dc.contributor.authorKoch, Alexander K.en
dc.contributor.authorPeyrache, Eloïcen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:15:18Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:15:18Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20600-
dc.description.abstractAn essential ingredient in models of career concerns is ex ante uncertainty about an agent'stype. This paper shows how career concerns can arise even in the absence of any such exante uncertainty, if the unobservable actions that an agent takes influence his futureproductivity. By implementing effort in mixed strategies the principal can endogenouslyinduce uncertainty about the agent's ex post productivity and generate reputationalincentives. Our main result is that creating such ambiguity can be optimal for the principal,even though this exposes the agent to additional risk and reduces output. This findingdemonstrates the importance of mixed strategies in contracting environments with imperfectcommitment, which contrasts with standard agency models where implementing mixedstrategy actions typically is not optimal if pure strategies are also implementable.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x1331en
dc.subject.jelM12en
dc.subject.jelL14en
dc.subject.jelJ33en
dc.subject.jelD80en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordincentive contractsen
dc.subject.keywordreputationen
dc.subject.keywordmixed strategiesen
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen
dc.subject.stwLeistungsanreizen
dc.subject.stwPrestigeen
dc.subject.stwKarriereplanungen
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleMixed Up? : That's Good for Motivation-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn474213412en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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