Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/205361
Authors: 
Shalvi, Shaul
Soraperra, Ivan
van der Weele, Joël J.
Villeval, Marie-Claire
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. TI 2019-071/I
Abstract: 
We investigate the role of advisers in the transmission of ethically relevant information, a critical aspect of executive decision making in organizations. In our laboratory experiment, advisers are informed about the negative externalities associated with the decision-maker's choices and compete with other advisers. We find that advisers suppress about a quarter of "inconvenient'' information. Suppression is not strategic, but based on the advisers' own preferences in the ethical dilemma. On the demand side, a substantial minority of decision makers avoid advisers who transmit inconvenient information (they "shoot the messenger''). Overall, by facilitating assortative matching, a competitive market for advisers efficiently caters to the demand for both information and information avoidance. Decision-makers are less likely to implement their preferred option when they are randomly matched to advisers and there is no scope for assortative matching.
Subjects: 
Self-deception
information avoidance
unethical behavior
experiment
JEL: 
D91
C91
D83
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
2.34 MB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.