Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/205352 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. TI 2019-062/II
Publisher: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Abstract: 
We study the issue of assigning weights to players that identify winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies. For this, we consider plurality games which are simple games in partition function form such that in every partition there is at least one winning coalition. Such a game is said to be precisely supportive if it is possible to assign weights to players in such a way that a coalition being winning in a partition implies that the combined weight of its members is maximal over all coalitions in the partition. A plurality game is decisive if in every partition there is exactly one winning coalition. We show that decisive plurality games with at most four players, majority games with an arbitrary number of players, and almost symmetric decisive plurality games with an arbitrary number of players are precisely supportive. Complete characterizations of a partition's winning coalitions are provided as well.
Subjects: 
plurality game
plurality voting
precise support
simple game in partition function form
winning coalition
JEL: 
C71
D62
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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