Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/205304 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. TI 2019-014/VII
Verlag: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Zusammenfassung: 
We show how price leadership bans, imposed as part of the European Commission's State aid control on all main mortgage providers except the largest bank, shifted the Dutch mortgage market from a competitive to a collusive price leadership equilibrium. In May 2009, mortgage rates in the Netherlands suddenly rose against the decreasing funding cost trend to almost a full percentage point above the Eurozone average. We derive equilibrium best-response functions, identify the price-leader, and estimate response adjustments in daily household mortgage rates between 2004 and 2012. Around the Spring of 2009, when the bans were collectively negotiated, we find structural decreases in the leader's cost pass-through, much closer following of its price, and strongly reduced transmissions of common cost changes into price-followers' mortgage rates. Indicative predicted overcharges are 125 basis points or 26%, on average.
Schlagwörter: 
banking
competition
price leadership
collusion
State aid
JEL: 
L11
G21
L85
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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