Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/205299
Authors: 
Hinloopen, Jeroen
Onderstal, Sander
Treuren, Leonard
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper TI 2019-009/VII
Abstract: 
Using laboratory experiments, we compare the stability of bidding rings in the English auction and the first-price sealed-bid auction in a heterogeneous-value setting. In both a re-matching condition and a fixed-matching condition, we observe that biddings rings are more stable in the English auction than in the first-price sealed-bid auction. In both conditions, the first-price sealed-bid auction dominates the English auction in terms of average revenue and the revenue spread. The English auction outperforms the first-price sealed-bid auction in terms of efficiency.
Subjects: 
Cartel stability
English auction
First-price sealed-bid auction
Laboratory experiments
JEL: 
C92
D44
L41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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