Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20524 
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dc.contributor.authorGautier, Pieter A.en
dc.contributor.authorMoraga-González, José Luisen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:14:45Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:14:45Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20524-
dc.description.abstractWe examine wage competition in a model where identical workers choose the number of jobsto apply for and identical firms simultaneously post a wage. The Nash equilibrium of thisgame exhibits the following properties: (i) an equilibrium where workers apply for just one jobexhibits unemployment and absence of wage dispersion; (ii) an equilibrium where workersapply for two or for more (but not for all) jobs always exhibits wage dispersion and, typically,unemployment; (iii) the equilibrium wage distribution with a higher vacancy-to-unemploymentratio first-order stochastically dominates the wage distribution with a lower level of labormarket tightness; (iv) the average wage is non-monotonic in the number of applications; (v)the equilibrium number of applications is non-monotonic in the vacancy-to-unemploymentratio; (vi) a minimum wage increase can be welfare improving because it compresses thewage distribution and reduces the congestion effects caused by the socially excessivenumber of applications; and (vii) the only way to obtain efficiency is to impose a mandatorywage that eliminates wage dispersion altogether.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x1260en
dc.subject.jelJ64en
dc.subject.jelJ41en
dc.subject.jelD4en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcoordination frictionsen
dc.subject.keywordinterneten
dc.subject.keywordjob searchen
dc.subject.keywordminimum wageen
dc.subject.keywordwage dispersionen
dc.subject.stwLohnbildungen
dc.subject.stwLohnverhandlungenen
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten
dc.subject.stwLohnverhandlungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsucheen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleStrategic Wage Setting and Coordination Frictions with Multiple Applications-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn395918529en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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