Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20524
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dc.contributor.authorGautier, Pieter A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorMoraga-González, José Luisen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:14:45Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:14:45Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20524-
dc.description.abstractWe examine wage competition in a model where identical workers choose the number of jobsto apply for and identical firms simultaneously post a wage. The Nash equilibrium of thisgame exhibits the following properties: (i) an equilibrium where workers apply for just one jobexhibits unemployment and absence of wage dispersion; (ii) an equilibrium where workersapply for two or for more (but not for all) jobs always exhibits wage dispersion and, typically,unemployment; (iii) the equilibrium wage distribution with a higher vacancy-to-unemploymentratio first-order stochastically dominates the wage distribution with a lower level of labormarket tightness; (iv) the average wage is non-monotonic in the number of applications; (v)the equilibrium number of applications is non-monotonic in the vacancy-to-unemploymentratio; (vi) a minimum wage increase can be welfare improving because it compresses thewage distribution and reduces the congestion effects caused by the socially excessivenumber of applications; and (vii) the only way to obtain efficiency is to impose a mandatorywage that eliminates wage dispersion altogether.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn-
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion paper series |x1260en_US
dc.subject.jelJ64en_US
dc.subject.jelJ41en_US
dc.subject.jelD4en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcoordination frictionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordinterneten_US
dc.subject.keywordjob searchen_US
dc.subject.keywordminimum wageen_US
dc.subject.keywordwage dispersionen_US
dc.subject.stwLohnbildungen_US
dc.subject.stwLohnverhandlungenen_US
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwLohnverhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsucheen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleStrategic Wage Setting and Coordination Frictions with Multiple Applicationsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn395918529en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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