Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20501
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dc.contributor.authorEpstein, Gil S.en_US
dc.contributor.authorGang, Ira N.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:14:34Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:14:34Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20501-
dc.description.abstractWe examine who benefits when there is a strong leader in place, and those who benefitwhen a situation lacks a proper leader. There are fractious terrorist groups who seek to servethe same people in common cause against a common enemy. The groups compete for rentsobtained from the public by engaging in actions against the common enemy. We derive acondition under which the concerned parties, the terrorist groups and the local populationupon whom the terrorist groups inflict their actions, benefit or lose in the two scenarios, andexamine the consequences of counter-terrorist policy.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion paper series |x1237en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelD71en_US
dc.subject.jelD74en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordterrorismen_US
dc.subject.keywordrent-seekingen_US
dc.subject.keywordall-pay auctionen_US
dc.subject.keywordlotteryen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitische Gewalten_US
dc.subject.stwMachten_US
dc.subject.stwRent Seekingen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.titleWho Is the Enemy?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn393555038en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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