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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20501
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Epstein, Gil S. | en |
dc.contributor.author | Gang, Ira N. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T16:14:34Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T16:14:34Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20501 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We examine who benefits when there is a strong leader in place, and those who benefitwhen a situation lacks a proper leader. There are fractious terrorist groups who seek to servethe same people in common cause against a common enemy. The groups compete for rentsobtained from the public by engaging in actions against the common enemy. We derive acondition under which the concerned parties, the terrorist groups and the local populationupon whom the terrorist groups inflict their actions, benefit or lose in the two scenarios, andexamine the consequences of counter-terrorist policy. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x1237 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D71 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D74 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | terrorism | en |
dc.subject.keyword | rent-seeking | en |
dc.subject.keyword | all-pay auction | en |
dc.subject.keyword | lottery | en |
dc.subject.stw | Politische Gewalt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Macht | en |
dc.subject.stw | Rent Seeking | en |
dc.subject.stw | Public Choice | en |
dc.title | Who Is the Enemy? | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 393555038 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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