Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/204916 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Papers No. 18-16
Verlag: 
University of Bern, Department of Economics, Bern
Zusammenfassung: 
An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. It chooses the probability of an investigation. Firms pick the degree of collusion: The more they collude, the higher are profits, but so is the probability of detection. Firms thus trade-off higher profits against higher expected fines. If firms are sufficiently patient, leniency is inffective; it may even increase collusion. Increasing the probability of an investigation at low levels does not increase deterrence. Increasing the probability of an investigation at high levels reduces collusion, yet never completely.
Schlagwörter: 
antitrust
cartels
deterrence
leniency
JEL: 
D43
K21
K42
L40
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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