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Autoren: 
Albrecht, James
Gautier, Pieter A.
Vroman, Susan
Datum: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 719
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze a model of directed search in which unemployed job seekers observe all posted wages. We allow for the possibility of multiple applications by workers and ex post competition among vacancies. For any number of applications, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which vacancies post a common wage. When workers apply to only one vacancy, a single wage is paid and the resulting equilibrium is efficient. When workers make multiple applications, there is dispersion in wages paid, and equilibrium may be inefficient. We show that our results also hold in a steady-state version of the model.
Schlagwörter: 
job search
directed search
matching
JEL: 
J41
D83
J64
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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