Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20487
Authors: 
Albrecht, James
Gautier, Pieter A.
Vroman, Susan
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion paper series 719
Abstract: 
We analyze a model of directed search in which unemployed job seekers observe all posted wages. We allow for the possibility of multiple applications by workers and ex post competition among vacancies. For any number of applications, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which vacancies post a common wage. When workers apply to only one vacancy, a single wage is paid and the resulting equilibrium is efficient. When workers make multiple applications, there is dispersion in wages paid, and equilibrium may be inefficient. We show that our results also hold in a steady-state version of the model.
Subjects: 
job search
directed search
matching
JEL: 
J41
D83
J64
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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