Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/204806 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics No. 12-2019
Verlag: 
Philipps-University Marburg, School of Business and Economics, Marburg
Zusammenfassung: 
Non-controlling minority shareholdings in rivals (NCMS) lower the sus- tainability of collusion under a wide variety of circumstances. Nevertheless, NCMS are sometimes deemed to facilitate collusion, in particular if the level of NCMS is exogenous. The present paper endogenizes firms' choice of NCMS and answers the question: Would colluding firms find it rational to acquire NCMS in rivals? The study of the acquisition reveals that firms have an in- centive to acquire NCMS which are accompanied by a shift from collusive to competitive behaviour.
Schlagwörter: 
Collusion
Coordinated Effects
Minority Shareholdings
Merger Control
Unilateral Effects
JEL: 
G34
K21
L41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
438.84 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.