Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/204740 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
SITE Working Paper No. 29
Publisher: 
Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE), Stockholm
Abstract: 
The theoretical framework of the adequacy or otherwise of fine reductions under the EU and US Leniency Programmes has been explored widely. However, the characteristics of the reporting cartel members remain unexplained. This is the first paper to develop a model where heterogeneous cartel members have private information on the probability of conviction. It is shown that firms which receive higher fines are more likely to report the cartel. To validate this result and analyze the sources of fine heterogeneity, data for EU and US cartels are used. Being the first reporter is shown to be correlated with recidivism, leadership and other fine reductions. Some characteristics of the cartels where reporting occurred are also unveiled. Identifying the characteristics of the reporting firms is vital to dissolve and dissuade cartels and the wider policy implications of these findings are discussed in the paper.
Subjects: 
Cartels
competition policy
Leniency Programme
private information
self-reporting
JEL: 
D43
K21
K42
L13
L40
L51
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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