Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/204709 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods No. 2019/11
Publisher: 
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Abstract: 
This article explores the impact of procedural information on the behavior of applicants under two of the most commonly used school admissions procedures: the Gale-Shapley mechanism and the Boston mechanism. In a lab experiment, I compare the impact of information about the mechanism, information about individually optimal application strategies, and information about both. I find that strategic and full information increase truth-telling and stability under the Gale-Shapley mechanism. Under the Boston mechanism, however, the adoption of equilibrium strategies remains unaffected. Contrary to prevailing assumptions in matching theory, I show that the Boston mechanism improves perceived fairness. These results underscore the importance of procedural information and suggest that eliminating justified envy may not be a sufficient condition of fairness.
Subjects: 
matching markets
school choice
transparency
fairness
law and market design
JEL: 
C78
C92
D47
I20
K10
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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