Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/204700 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods No. 2019/2
Verlag: 
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Arguably, for many citizens the perceived expected disutility from sanctions is smaller than the monetary gain from tax evasion. Nevertheless most people pay their taxes most of the time. In a lab experiment, we show that the willingness to pay taxes even absent enforcement is indeed pronounced. Yet voluntary compliance is reduced if participants learn that income is heterogeneous. The effect is driven by participants with the lowest income. The reduction obtains irrespective of the tax regime. If the tax is proportional to income, or progressive, participants become more skeptical about the willingness of participants with high income to comply.
Schlagwörter: 
tax evasion
tax morale
heterogeneity
income inequality
lump sum tax
proportional tax
progressive tax
beliefs
path model
JEL: 
C30
C91
D01
D02
D31
D63
D91
H26
K34
K42
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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