Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20444 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorPeter, Klara Sabirianovaen
dc.contributor.authorEarle, John S.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:14:09Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:14:09Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20444-
dc.description.abstractWe present a model of neighborhood effects in wage payment delays. Positive feedbackarises because each employer?s arrears affect the late payment costs faced by other firms inthe same local labor market, resulting in a strategic complementarity in the practice. Themodel is estimated on panel data for workers and firms in Russia, facilitating identificationthrough the use of a rich set of covariates and fixed effects at the level of the employee, theemployer, and the local labor market. We also exploit a policy intervention affecting publicsector workers that provides an instrumental variable to estimate the endogenous reaction inthe non-public sector. Consistently across specifications, the estimated reaction functiondisplays strongly positive neighborhood effects, and the estimates of four feedback loops – operating through worker quits, effort, strikes, and legal penalties – imply that costs of delaysare attenuated by neighborhood arrears. We also study a nonlinear case exhibiting twostable equilibria: a ?punctual payment equilibrium? and a ?late payment equilibrium.? Theestimates imply that the theoretical conditions for multiple equilibria under symmetric locallabor market competition are satisfied in our data.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x1198en
dc.subject.jelA12en
dc.subject.jelB52en
dc.subject.jelP37en
dc.subject.jelJ30en
dc.subject.jelO17en
dc.subject.jelP31en
dc.subject.jelK42en
dc.subject.jelL14en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordwage arrearsen
dc.subject.keywordcontract violationen
dc.subject.keywordneighborhood effecten
dc.subject.keywordsocial interactionsen
dc.subject.keywordmultiple equilibriaen
dc.subject.keywordnetwork externalityen
dc.subject.keywordstrategic complementarityen
dc.subject.stwLohnen
dc.subject.stwVerbindlichkeitenen
dc.subject.stwVergütungssystemen
dc.subject.stwNachbarschaftsökonomieen
dc.subject.stwÜbergangswirtschaften
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen
dc.subject.stwRusslanden
dc.subject.stwLohnrückständeen
dc.titleContract Violations, Neighborhood Effects, and Wage Arrears in Russia-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn390563285en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
485.31 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.