Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/204323
Authors: 
Hansen, Lars Gårn
Jensen, Frank
Russell, Clifford
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
FOI Working Paper 2011/6
Abstract: 
In this paper we undertake a systematic investigation of instrument choice when preventing a population collapse rather than maximizing industry profit is the overriding concern. Contrary to what seems to be the general consensus we find that landing fees do provide more effective insurance against extinction than quotas under more or less the same conditions as those implying that landing fees are better at maximising industry profit. Thus, the efficiency of the regulatory instrument mainly depends on the basic information asymmetries characterizing the fishery, and is not sensitive to whether the regulators total catch goals are set according to economic or precautionary principles.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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