Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/204321 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
FOI Working Paper No. 2011/3
Verlag: 
University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics (IFRO), Copenhagen
Zusammenfassung: 
In many developing countries, groundwater is a common pool resource which is potentially subject to the tragedy of the commons if water extraction is not adequately regulated. However, in these countries, the regulatory infrastructure is often too weak to allow detailed monitoring of individual groundwater extraction. For this reason, classical public intervention instruments, such as consumption fees or tradable quotas, are infeasible. Here we present a theoretical foundation for a new public regulatory instrument that can potentially generate the same efficiency inducing incentives as fees and tradable quotas, but without their information and monitoring requirements. The instrument we propose is a tax based on aggregate extraction, rather than individual extraction measures.
Schlagwörter: 
Developing countries
groundwater use
moral hazard problems
taxes
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
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