Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/204319 
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
FOI Working Paper No. 2011/1
Publisher: 
University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics (IFRO), Copenhagen
Abstract: 
I demonstrate that providing information about product quality is not necessarily the best way to address asymmetric information problems when markets are imperfectly competitive. In a vertical differentiation model I show that a Minimum Quality Standard, which retains asymmetric information, generates more welfare than a label, which provides full information.
Subjects: 
minimum quality standard
label
asymmetric information
vertical differentiation
product quality
JEL: 
L13
L15
L51
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.