Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20430 
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dc.contributor.authorGrossmann, Volkeren
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:14:03Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:14:03Z-
dc.date.issued2003-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20430-
dc.description.abstractThis paper develops a model with multiple market locations in which the quality of intangible assets of firms, provided by management, determines the firms? performance. Despite an exante symmetry of potential entrants, the equilibrium assignment of heterogeneous managerial skills to firms tends to be asymmetric. This sorting outcome determines both the goods market structure at single locations and the size distribution of firms. Results are consistent with a number of observed patterns regarding the size distribution of firms andestablishments, and the relation of firm size to profitability, productivity, managerial skills and manager remuneration.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x738en
dc.subject.jelD40en
dc.subject.jelJ31en
dc.subject.jelL16en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric equilibriumen
dc.subject.keywordfirm sizeen
dc.subject.keywordintangible assetsen
dc.subject.keywordmanagerial jobassignmenten
dc.subject.stwFührungskräfteen
dc.subject.stwQualifikationen
dc.subject.stwIntangibles Guten
dc.subject.stwMarkteintritten
dc.subject.stwUnvollkommener Wettbewerben
dc.subject.stwIndustrieökonomiken
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleManagerial Job Assignment and Imperfect Competition in Asymmetric-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn362030855en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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